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Childrenwith Imaginary Companions
Focus onMental CharacteristicsWhen
Describing Their Real-Life Friends
Paige E. Davisa, ElizabethMeinsb,* andCharles Fernyhougha
aDepartment of Psychology, Durham University, Durham UK
bDepartment of Psychology, University of York, York UK
Relations between having an imaginary companion (IC) and (i) de-
scriptions of a real-life friend, (ii) theory of mind performance, and
(iii) reported prosocial behaviour and behavioural difﬁculties were in-
vestigated in a sample of 5-year-olds (N=159). Childrenwhohad an IC
were more likely than their peers without an IC to describe their best
friends with reference to their mental characteristics, but IC status
was unrelated to children’s theory of mind performance and reported
prosocial behaviour and behavioural difﬁculties. These ﬁndings are
discussed in the context of the proposal that there is a competence–
performance gap in children’smentalizing abilities. © 2014TheAuthors.
Infant and Child Development published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd.
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Young children’s tendency to invent imaginary companions is well known. An
imaginary companion (IC) may be entirely invisible or embodied in a toy or object
(so-called personiﬁed objects), and as many as two-thirds of children report the
existence of an IC at some point in childhood (Carlson & Taylor, 2005; Fernyhough,
Bland, Meins, & Coltheart, 2007; Gleason, 2005; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Taylor,
Carlson, Maring, Gerow, & Charley, 2004).
Taylor and Carlson (1997) were the ﬁrst to propose that having an IC provides the
child with greater opportunities to practise representing what others are potentially
thinking. Subsequent research has supported this proposal, with studies showing
how having an IC relates positively to children’s tendency to represent people’s
differing perspectives. For example, Roby and Kidd (2008) investigated relations
between IC status and children’s communication by using an experimental para-
digm to assess the child’s ability both to convey and process verbal information
(Camaioni, Ercolani, & Lloyd, 1995). The stimuli in each trial consisted of four pic-
tures of the same entity varying on two dimensions (e.g. pictures of the same clown
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with a red or green collar, wearing a top hat or a bobble hat). In the speaker condi-
tion, the child was required to describe a particular picture in order to help the ex-
perimenter (who was behind a barrier) select it. In the listening condition, children
had to select the picture when they were given either an ambiguous (e.g. wearing a
top hat) or unambiguous (e.g. wearing a green collar and a top hat) description.
Roby and Kidd found no IC-related differences in children’s performance on the lis-
tening condition, but in the speaker condition, IC children were better able than
their peers without ICs (NIC) to name a speciﬁc referent (e.g. the green collar)
and to avoid describing redundant features. In a similar vein, Trionﬁ and Reese
(2009) reported that IC-group children produced richer narrative accounts than
their NIC peers both when telling a story and when narrating a personally experi-
enced past event, despite the fact that the IC and NIC groups did not differ in their
receptive or expressive linguistic abilities. Children with ICs are also better at
understanding that other people are not the best judge of unobservable aspects of
themselves, such as whether they are dreaming or feeling hungry (Davis, Meins,
& Fernyhough, 2011).
Taken together, these ﬁndings show that children who create an IC have a
better understanding of what information a listener or observer has and does
not have access to, suggesting that they are better able to take others’
perspectives into account. Moreover, ICs appear to fulﬁl similar social roles
to children’s real friends. Research suggests that ICs are not invented to
compensate for children failing to make real-life friendships (e.g. Gleason,
2004; Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup, 2000), and children appear to interact with
ICs in similar ways to their interactions with real people (Gleason, 2002;
Taylor, 1999). For example, Gleason and Hohmann (2006) found that there
were no differences in children’s reported interactions with ICs or friends with
whom the friendship was reciprocated. However, children reported that they
were more likely to want to play with or tell a secret to their IC than to a real
friend with whom the friendship was not reciprocated. Recent research also
suggests that interactions with ICs play a similar role to real-life social
engagement in facilitating children’s private speech development (Davis, Meins,
& Fernyhough, 2013).
Despite these observed parallels between children’s real and imaginary
friendships, research has not yet addressed whether having an IC relates to
how children think about and represent their real-world friends. Investigating
this issue was the main aim of the study reported here. Speciﬁcally, we were
interested in whether children’s creation of an IC related to their tendency
spontaneously to describe their real friends with reference to their mental
characteristics rather than their physical appearance or behavioural traits. It
was predicted that children with an IC would be more likely to invoke
thoughts, desires, beliefs, and emotions in describing a real friend because
of the greater salience of internal states afforded to them by engaging with
their IC.
Individual differences in 7- to 9-year-olds’ descriptions of a best friend were
investigated by Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson, and Lidstone (2006) using an adap-
tation of the interview used to assess mothers’ mind-mindedness (Meins, 1997) in
describing their preschoolers (Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998).
While all children mentioned friends’ behavioural characteristics and over three-
quarters included a physical description, only 54% of children used a mental
attribute to describe their best friend. To explore potential reasons for individual
differences in children’s mental descriptions, Meins et al. (2006) investigated
whether performance on the friend description task related to concurrent use of
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internal-state language when narrating a wordless picture book, and to children’s
theory of mind (ToM) abilities as assessed using Happé’s (1994) strange stories
task. Children’s mental descriptions of their best friend were highly positively cor-
related with their use of internal-state language during the book-narration task,
suggesting stability in children’s tendency to invoke internal states either when de-
scribing a friend or when explaining and interpreting the events in a book. In con-
trast, internal-state language use on neither task related to children’s ToM
performance. Meins et al. argued that having a ToM does not necessarily mean
that children will spontaneously use their knowledge of internal states when
representing and interpreting other people and their behaviour. Apperly (2012)
has also recently discussed this notion of a competence–performance gap in chil-
dren’s mentalizing abilities.
As well as exploring the link between IC status and children’s descriptions of
friends, the study reported here investigated whether there was a similar compe-
tence–performance gap between children’s core ToM abilities and their tendency
spontaneously to focus on internal states when describing a friend. The present
study involved children who were younger (age 5) than the 7- to 9-year-olds in
Meins et al.’s (2006) study; hence, we assessed children’s ToM abilities by using
a battery of standard ToM tests (Wellman & Liu, 2004) rather than the strange
stories task. Including a ToM assessment also enabled us to attempt to replicate
and extend a number of other ﬁndings in the extant literature.
First, we exploredwhether children’s IC status related to their core understanding
of false belief. Studies investigating relations between IC status and children’s ToM
performance present a mixed picture, with some studies suggesting that IC-group
children outperform their NIC-group peers (Taylor & Carlson, 1997), while others
ﬁnd no relation between IC status and ToM (Davis et al., 2011; Fernyhough et al.,
2007). However, there is no consistency in how ToM has been measured across
these studies. Taylor and Carlson (1997) assessed ToM by using diverse tasks
(e.g. appearance–reality, picture identiﬁcation) that are not included inmore recently
standardized ToM batteries that focus on children’s understanding of belief states
(e.g. Wellman & Liu, 2004). Fernyhough et al. (2007) assessed ToM by using Flavell,
Green, and Flavell’s (1993) ‘stream of consciousness’ task, in which children have to
demonstrate an understanding that people have ongoing thought processes even
when they are not engaged in any obvious thought-provoking activity. Davis
et al. (2011) used a standardized ToM battery, but the children in this study varied
between 4 and 7 years, raising the suspicion that the ToM tasks were not appropri-
ate for all of the children given that 7-year-olds are likely to be at ceiling on standard
ToM tasks. Thus, no study has yet investigated whether performance on a stan-
dardized, age-appropriate ToM battery relates to children’s IC status.
Finally, we investigated whether children’s reported behaviour related to their
IC status, ToM performance, and tendency to describe their friends with reference
to their mental characteristics. Gleason (2004) argued that having an IC can poten-
tially improve children’s relationships with peers by enabling children to have
more practice of peer interaction. It may be the case that engaging with an IC facil-
itates children’s real-life prosocial behaviour, which in turn may relate to children’s
ToM and tendency to focus on their real friends’ mental characteristics. No study
has investigated how children’s IC status relates to their prosocial behaviour with
peers. Indeed, as Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, and Banerjee (2012) noted, studies inves-
tigating social relationships and children’s understanding of other minds are sur-
prisingly rare. The study reported here was thus the ﬁrst to explore how having
an IC related to children’s behaviour with peers, and focused both on reported
prosocial behaviour and behavioural difﬁculties.
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In summary, the present study investigated how children’s IC status related to
their descriptions of a best friend, performance on a battery of ToM tasks, and
reported prosocial behaviour and behavioural difﬁculties. It was hypothesized
that having an IC would be positively associated with mental descriptions of
friends. We also investigated how IC status related to children’s ToM performance
and reported behaviour, although no directional hypotheses were made regarding
these associations.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were a socially diverse sample of 159 children (81 girls) who had been
participating with their mothers in a longitudinal study that began in the child’s
ﬁrst year of life (Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & Turner, 2011; Meins,
Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam & de Rosnay, 2013; Meins et al., 2012; Meins, Muñoz
Centifanti, Fernyhough & Fishburn, 2013). Family socio-economic status (SES) was
assessed using the Hollingshead Index (Hollingshead, 1975), with scores ranging
from 14 to 66 (M= 35.78, SD= 14.03). Children were aged between 59 and
64months (M= 61.3months, SD= 1.08months). Parents gave full informed con-
sent for their children to be tested and recorded in their schools.
Materials and Methods
Children were tested individually by a female experimenter in a quiet area in their
school. Tasks were administered in the order described below.
Theory of mind
A battery of ToM tasks was administered to each child. The battery consisted of
six tasks used extensively in the ﬁeld, based onWellman and Liu (2004): (i) Diverse
Beliefs task to assess children’s understanding of non-egocentric beliefs, (ii)
Knowledge Access task to assess children’s understanding of the relation between
seeing and knowing, (iii) Contents False Belief–Other task to assess children’s abil-
ity to override their own knowledge of the (unexpected) contents of a container in
predicting a naïve child’s belief about its contents, (iv) Contents False Belief–Self
task to assess children’s ability to override their current knowledge of the (unex-
pected) contents of a container and recognize their own initial false belief about
its contents, (v) Explicit False Belief task to assess children’s ability to predict the
protagonist’s search behaviour on the basis of what they are told about where he
or she thinks the object is rather than where the object really is, and (vi) Unexpected
Transfer task to assess children’s ability to predict the protagonist’s behaviour on
the basis of his or her false belief.
The order in which the stories were presented was randomized and
counterbalanced, and the gender of the story protagonists matched that of the
child. Memory and reality control questions were used, and all control and test
questions had to be passed for the child to be credited with passing each task.
For each task passed, the child received 1 point, resulting in total possible scores
ranging from 0 to 6 points. The internal reliability of the ToM battery was satisfac-
tory, Cronbach’s α= .68, and in line with those of studies employing similar ToM
measures (e.g. Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Meins et al., 2002). Total scores out of
6 were used in the analyses.
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Descriptions of best friend
The experimenter ﬁrst asked the child if he or she had a best friend. No child
reported that he or she did not have a best friend. After the child named their best
friend, he or she was asked, ‘Can you tell me about [friend’s name]?’ When the
child ﬁnished the description, the experimenter asked, ‘Is there anything else
you would like to tell me about [friend’s name]?’ Children were audio-taped while
describing their best friend, and the descriptions were later transcribed verbatim.
The descriptions were divided into discrete descriptions that could be single
words, phrases, or sentences.
The protocol described by Meins et al. (2006) was used to code children’s mental
descriptions of their friends. The transcripts were coded by a researcher who was
blind to all other data. Each description was placed into one of Meins et al.’s exclu-
sive and exhaustive categories: (i)Mental: references to the friend’s desires, emotions,
cognitions, intellect, and the friend’s responses to the child’s own internal states (e.g.
‘He’s kind when I hurt myself’); (ii) Behavioural: references to activities or interac-
tions that could be interpreted on a purely behavioural level (e.g. ‘She rides a bicycle’,
‘He plays with me’), (iii) Physical: references to physical characteristics, age, or posi-
tion in the family (e.g. ‘He has light brown hair’, ‘She’s got a sister called Kate’), (iv)
General: any comment that did not ﬁt into the categories above (e.g. ‘He’s got a big
garage’). Describing the friend as ‘nice’ was included in the general category if no
other information was provided to qualify how to characterize being ‘nice’.
A randomly selected 30% of the transcripts was coded by a second researcher
who was blind to all other data and to the hypotheses of the study; inter-rater
reliability was κ = .75. Children received a score for the total number of mental
descriptions and for mental descriptions as a percentage of the total number of
friend descriptions. Percentage scores were used in the analyses to control for
individual differences in verbosity. (Note, however, that the exact same pattern
of ﬁndings emerged if frequency scores were used.)
Imaginary companion interview
The interview developed by Taylor and Carlson (1997) was used to assess
children’s IC status. Children were asked by the researcher about their pretend
friends. The researcher began,
‘Now I am going to ask you some questions about friends. Some friends are real, like
the kids who live on your street, the ones you play with. And some friends are
pretend friends. Pretend friends are ones that aremake-believe that you pretend are real.
Do you understand?’
When the child indicated understanding, the researcher went on to ask if the child
had a pretend friend. If the child indicated the existence of an IC by responding
afﬁrmatively, they were asked: (i) its name; (ii) whether people other than the child
could see the IC; (iii) whether the child could see the IC; (iv) its gender, age, and
physical appearance; (v) what the child liked and disliked about the friend; and
(vi) where the friend lived and slept.
The children’s mothers separately completed a parental questionnaire on
whether or not the child had an IC. In addition to the questions on the child’s IC
interview, mothers were asked to indicate how long the child had had the IC
and whether it was entirely imaginary or personiﬁed in a toy or object. These data
from the mothers enabled us to establish whether the child’s IC was corroborated
by a parent. Children were credited with having an IC either if the IC was corrob-
orated by the mother or if the child provided a convincing, ﬂeshed-out description
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of the IC. All of the children who reported ICs that were not corroborated by the
mother explained in the interview that the IC was known only to them, often
saying that its existence was secret. Two independent coders rated the veracity of
the non-corroborated ICs, achieving perfect agreement.
Receptive language ability
Children’s receptive verbal ability was assessed at age 51months using the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997)
to control for any effects of verbal ability on ToM performance or children’s friend
descriptions. Verbal ability data were available for 134 children. The mean stan-
dardized score was M= 102.65, SD= 12.86, range 43–132.
Children’s reported behaviour
Children’s behavioural difﬁculties were assessed using the Strengths and Difﬁ-
culties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997), which was completed by the child’s
teacher and the child’s mother. The SDQ includes 25 items that are each rated on a
3-point scale (‘not true’, ‘somewhat true’, and ‘certainly true’), and is suitable for
children aged between 3 and 16 years. Children’s behaviour is rated on ﬁve
separate scales: (a) emotional symptoms (e.g. worried, nervous, fearful, or un-
happy behaviour), (b) conduct problems (e.g. temper tantrums, ﬁghting, bullying,
lying), (c) hyperactivity (e.g. restlessness, concentration difﬁculties, impulsivity),
(d) peer problems (e.g. solitary behaviour, being picked on or bullied), and (e)
prosocial (e.g. considerate to others’ feelings, shares readily). Scores on subscales
(b) and (c) are totaled to give an externalizing behaviour score (range = 0 to 20),
and scores on subscales (a) and (d) are totaled to give an internalizing behaviour
score (range = 0 to 20), with potential prosocial scores ranging between 0 and 10.
Following Kamphaus and Frick (2002), the SDQ data from mothers and teachers
were used to create resolved scores, such that the child was credited with the
higher score for a particular SDQ item if it was endorsed by either respondent.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses
Sixty-eight children (43%) reported having an IC, 34 of which were corroborated
by their mothers. Of the 68 ICs, 47 were invisible; of the 34 corroborated ICs, 23
were invisible. The patterns of effect were the same when analyses were run using
the maternally corroborated and total IC groups, and so only analyses involving
all 68 children in the IC group are reported below.
Mothers reported that the IC had existed for between 2 and 48months, with the
average duration of existence being 25.19months (SD=12.65months). Thus, all ICs that
were corroborated by mothers were long-standing. Children in the invisible IC and
personiﬁed object IC groups did not differ on any of the variables (ts< .90, ds< .24),
and so these two categories were collapsed in the analyses.
Seventy children (44%) used at least one mental characteristic to describe their best
friend. Percentage scores for mental descriptions were non-normally distributed.
Spearman’s ρ was thus used for the correlational analyses, but analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) was used since the F-test is robust against violations of the assumption of
normality as long as there are at least 20 degrees of freedom for error (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007).
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Children’s IC status was marginally related to SES, with children in the IC
group coming from higher SES backgrounds (M= 38.61, SD= 12.61) than children
in the NIC group (M= 34.02, SD= 14.80), t(157) = 1.95, p= .053, d= .33.
Child gender was unrelated to IC status, χ2(1) = 0.01, p= .911, to reported inter-
nalizing behaviours, t(157) = 0.97, p= .336, d= .17, and to BPVS scores, t(132) = 0.50,
p= .619, d= .09. Girls (M= 8.74, SD= 1.54) were reported to be more prosocial than
were boys (M= 7.74, SD= 2.05), t(157) = 3.00, p= .003, d= .55, and girls (M= 4.35,
SD=1.56) achievedmarginally higher ToM scores than did boys (M=3.83, SD=1.72),
t(157)= 1.86, p= .066, d= .32. Boys (M=25.69, SD=31.73) achieved marginally higher
scores for percentage of mental descriptions of friends than did girls (M= 17.53,
SD=24.13), t(157) =1.72, p= .088, d= .29. Boys (M=3.95, SD=3.11) were also reported
to have marginally higher levels of externalizing behaviours compared with girls
(M= 2.77, SD= 3.44), t(157) = 1.93, p= .056, d= .36.
Children’s ToM scores were positively correlated with BPVS scores, r(130) = .40,
p< .001, and reported prosocial behaviour, r(156) = .18, p= .045, and were negatively
correlatedwith reported externalizing behaviours, r(156) =.25, p= .002. ToM scores
were unrelated to reported internalizing behaviours, r(156) = .12, p= .143.
IC Status and Mental Descriptions of Best Friends
Table 1 shows the mean scores for percentage of mental descriptions as a function
of IC status. The relation between children’s IC status and their tendency to
describe a best friend with reference to mental characteristics was investigated in
a 2 (IC, NIC) × 2 (male, female) ANCOVA with children’s receptive verbal ability
and SES entered as covariates.
There was amain effect of IC status, F(1, 127) = 20.92, p= .001, η2 = .141, a margin-
ally signiﬁcant main effect of gender, F(1, 127) = 2.92, p= .090, η2 = .020, and no IC
status × child gender interaction, F(1, 127) = 0.02, p= .897, η2 = .001. Controlling for
receptive verbal ability, SES, and gender, children in the IC group were more likely
than their NIC-group peers to describe a best friend with reference to mental
characteristics.
IC Status and Theory of Mind
Table 1 shows the mean ToM scores as a function of IC status. The relation between
children’s IC status and their ToM performance was investigated using ANCOVA as
above. There was a main effect of child gender, F(1, 127) = 4.23, p= .040, η2 = .029, no
main effect of IC status, F(1, 127)= 0.05, p= .823, η2 = .003, and no IC status× child
Table 1. Mean (standard deviation) friend description, theory of mind, receptive verbal
ability, and child behaviour scores as a function of imaginary companion status
No imaginary companion Imaginary companion
Percentage of mental descriptions 12.61 (20.37) 29.63 (32.57)
Total number of descriptions 4.54 (2.28) 4.94 (2.60)
Theory of mind 3.96 (1.67) 4.23 (1.64)
British Picture Vocabulary Scale 103.55 (12.19) 103.07 (13.74)
SDQ externalizing behaviours 6.83 (4.17) 6.60 (3.46)
SDQ internalizing behaviours 3.88 (2.80) 4.14 (3.50)
SDQ prosocial behaviour 7.87 (2.03) 8.34 (1.80)
SDQ, Strengths and Difﬁculties Questionnaire.
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gender interaction, F(1, 127) = 0.16, p= .692, η2 = .001. Controlling for receptive verbal
ability, SES, and IC status, girls performed better on the ToM task than did boys.
IC Status and Reported Child Behaviour
Table 1 shows the mean SDQ externalizing, internalizing, and prosocial behaviour
scores as a function of IC status. The relation between children’s IC status and their
reported behaviour was investigated using ANCOVA as above. For SDQ external-
izing behaviours, there was a main effect of child gender, F(1, 126) = 8.20, p= .005,
η2 = .057, no main effect of IC status, F(1, 126) = 0.11, p= .736, η2 = .001, and no IC
status × child gender interaction, F(1, 126) = 1.77, p= .186, η2 = .012. Controlling
for receptive verbal ability, SES, and IC status, boys were reported to have more
externalizing behaviours than were girls.
For SDQ internalizing behaviours, there was no main effect of IC status, F(1,
126) =0.76, p= .386, η2 = .006, no main effect of child gender, F(1, 126) =0.14, p= .708,
η2 = .001, and no IC status× child gender interaction, F(1, 126) = 1.48, p= .227, η2 = .012.
With respect to SDQ prosocial behaviours, there was a main effect of child
gender, F(1, 126)= 9.97, p= .002, η2 = .086, no main effect of IC status, F(1, 126) = 1.35,
p= .248, η2 = .012, and no IC status× child gender interaction, F(1, 126)= 0.94,
p= .336, η2 = .008. Controlling for receptive verbal ability, SES, and IC status, girls
were reported to behave more prosocially than were boys.
Correlates of Mental Descriptions of Best Friends
Children’s tendency to describe a best friend with reference to their mental charac-
teristics was unrelated to concurrent ToM performance and reported SDQ exter-
nalizing behaviours, internalizing behaviours, and prosocial behaviours (ρs< .09).
DISCUSSION
Themain aim of the study reported here was to investigate how having an IC related
to children’s tendency spontaneously to focus on mental characteristics when given
an open-ended invitation to describe a best friend. The results showed that children
with ICs were more likely than their NIC peers to describe their best friend with
reference tomental characteristics. Our second aimwas to investigate how children’s
IC status related to their performance on a battery of tasks assessing core ToM abili-
ties. No association was found between ToM performance and IC status, replicating
the null ﬁndings of Fernyhough et al. (2007) and Davis et al. (2011). In contrast, the
lack of association between IC status and ToM is at odds with Taylor and Carlson’s
(1997) ﬁnding that children with ICs showed superior ToM abilities compared with
their NIC counterparts. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, the ToM assess-
ment in Taylor and Carlson’s study differed from that used in the present study. Two
of the three tasks used to assess ToM in this earlier study involved understanding
different perspectives (e.g. the difference between appearance and reality) rather
than belief states. Thus, it may be the case that having an IC was positively related
speciﬁcally to children’s understanding of perspective-taking, and this may explain
the discrepancy in ﬁndings. Taylor and Carlson did not report how IC status related
to performance on the individual ToM tasks, but it would be interesting to explore in
future research whether childrenwith ICs have a speciﬁc advantage in understand-
ing diverse perspectives rather than diverse beliefs.
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We also replicated Meins et al.’s (2006) null ﬁnding on the relation between ToM
performance and children’s tendency to describe their friendswith reference tomental
characteristics. The present study assessed core ToM abilities in a sample of 5-year-
olds, whereas Meins et al. assessed understanding of more sophisticated aspects of
mind (e.g. faux pas, white lies) in 7- to 9-year-olds. Given that both studies found no
association between the ToM measure and children’s mental descriptions of friends,
it would appear that the null ﬁndings cannot be explained in terms of children’s
age or method of ToM assessment. Moreover, replicating well-established relations
(e.g. Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hughes & Ensor, 2007), we found that children’s
ToM scores were positively correlated with their receptive verbal ability and nega-
tively correlated with reported externalizing behaviours. It would thus appear
unlikely that our assessment of children’s ToM abilities was invalid or unreliable.
The fact that mental descriptions of friends did not relate to ToM performance
suggests that the basic ability to understand the relation between beliefs and be-
haviour is not equivalent to the tendency in everyday life to represent people in
mentalistic terms—the latter quality is what Meins (1997) termed mind-mindedness.
Ourﬁndings are thus consistentwith the view that there is a competence–performance
gap inmentalizing abilities (Apperly, 2012;Meins et al., 2006). The observed pattern of
ﬁndings is also in line with the results of a series of studies reported by Meins,
Fernyhough, and Harris-Waller (2014), which suggested that mind-mindedness is a
quality of personal relationships. Meins et al. (2014) found robust positive correlations
between adults’mental descriptions of different people with whom they had close
relationships (e.g. child, romantic partner, close friend). However, the tendency to
describe a signiﬁcant other with reference to mental characteristics was unrelated
to individuals’ tendency to focus on such characteristics when describing famous
people or works of art. Furthermore, individuals were more likely to include
mental characteristics when describing someone with whom they had a close
relationship, leading Meins et al. to argue that mind-mindedness is not a trait-like
quality, but a facet of personal relationships. We should thus not be surprised by
the observed lack of association between children’s mental descriptions of a best
friend and their general mentalizing abilities.
A further aim of the present study was to explore how children’s reported
prosocial behaviour and behavioural difﬁculties related to both their IC status
and their tendency to focus on their friends’mental characteristics. No associations
were found between children’s reported behaviour and either IC status or friend
descriptions. In addition, although the positive correlation between reported
prosocial behaviour and children’s ToM was signiﬁcant, the effect size for this
relation was small. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that children’s grasp
of internal states is not necessarily translated into a greater awareness of people’s
motives and intentions in everyday interactions. Indeed, given the research showing
high-level ToM understanding in ringleader bullies (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham,
1999), a good grasp of the link between beliefs and behaviours may be used in more
Machiavellian ways to manipulate and dominate others.
The ﬁndings reported here suggest several avenues for future research. The ob-
served positive association between having an IC and tending to focus on mental
characteristics in describing a best friend is consistent with the notion that having
an IC entails that the child becomes practiced in focusing on cognitions and
emotions (Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Further, our ﬁndings show that this focus on
internal states appears to generalize to how children represent their real-life friends.
However, given that IC status and children’s friend descriptions were assessed con-
currently, the opposite direction of cause and effect should also be considered: it
may be that children’s tendency to emphasize their friends’ mental and emotional
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characteristics will make them more likely to invent an IC. Although the present
study’s concurrent data cannot provide a deﬁnitive answer to the question of cause
and effect, the fact that ICs were reported by the mothers to have existed for a large
proportion of the children’s lives (over 25months on average) suggests that
inventing an IC is unlikely to be the result of children’s mind-mindedness in rela-
tion to their friends. Indeed, because these children were in the ﬁrst year of school
and describing friends whom they may have known for a relatively short period of
time, it is likely that the ICs will have predated the establishment of these friend-
ships. Future research should explore longitudinal relations between the creation
of an IC, the establishment of real-world friendships, and children’s mental descrip-
tions of friends in order to establish the true direction of cause and effect.
Exploring individual differences in children’s ICs is alsoworthy of future research
attention. ICs differ in the extent to which they are perceived to lead lives indepen-
dently of the children who create them; some are replicas of their child creators,
whereas others are very different and reportedly behave in ways that their creator
dislikes, disapproves of, or is surprised by (see Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Taylor,
Hulette, & Dishion, 2010). It may be that children who have ICs who they deem to
behave badly will be less likely to recognize prosocial acts in their peers and behave
in prosocial ways themselves. In investigating this issue, it would be worthwhile to
assess how children spontaneously describe their ICs as well as their real-life friends
to investigate concordance in the types of characteristics mentioned. Research on ICs
asks children various questions about the IC’s appearance and behaviour, but to our
knowledge, no study has yet assessed the characteristics that children spontaneously
focus on when given an open-ended invitation to describe the IC. Studies exploring
heterogeneity within IC-group children could thus enrich our understanding of how
imagination relates to children’s real-world relationships with peers.
Finally, the study reported here relied solely on adult report to index children’s
behavioural difﬁculties and prosocial behaviour. The null ﬁndings on relations
between children’s behaviour and both their IC status and tendency to describe
friends with reference to mental characteristics should thus be treated with a
degree of caution. Future research should explore these relations further by
obtaining observational measures of children’s behaviour or using experimental
tasks to assess children’s tendency to behave prosocially. These more in-depth
assessments of peer interaction will provide a clearer picture of how children’s
engagement with an IC and their tendency to focus on their real friends’ mental
characteristics relate to their actual behaviour with peers.
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